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Time-inconsistent consumption-investment problems in
incomplete markets under general discount functions
Yushi Hamaguchi∗
Abstract
In this paper we study a time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem with
random endowments in a possibly incomplete market under general discount functions.
We provide a necessary condition and a verification theorem for an open-loop equilib-
rium consumption-investment pair in terms of a coupled forward-backward stochastic
differential equation. Moreover, we prove the uniqueness of the open-loop equilibrium
pair by showing that the original time-inconsistent problem is equivalent to an associ-
ated time-consistent one.
Keywords: Time-inconsistency; open-loop equilibrium; incomplete market; forward-
backward stochastic differential equation.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate a time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem in an
incomplete market under general discount functions. In the recent years, time-inconsistent
control problems have received remarkable attentions in control theory, mathematical finance
and Economics. Time-inconsistency for a dynamic control problem means that the so-called
Bellman’s principle of optimality does not hold. In other words, a restriction of an opti-
mal control for a specific initial pair on a later time interval might not be optimal for that
corresponding initial pair. Such a situation occurs for example in dynamic mean-variance
control problems and in utility maximization problems for consumption-investment strategies
under non-exponential discounting. In this paper we focus on the later problem. In classi-
cal consumption-investment problems under discounted utility, the discount function which
represents the time-preference of an investor is assumed to be exponential. This assumption
implies that the discount rate is constant over time and provides the possibility to compare
outcomes occurring at different times by discounting future utility at a constant rate. The
compatibility of discounted utility at different times leads to time-consistency of the problem,
and hence we can use the classical dynamic programming approaches and the analytical tools
of the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations to obtain the optimal strategy together
with the value function. However, results from experimental studies indicate that discount
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rates for near future are much lower than discount rates for the time further away in future,
that contradict the assumption of exponential discounting; see, e.g., Ainslie [1]. Therefore,
it is important to investigate consumption-investment problems under non-exponential dis-
counting. Unfortunately, in the case of non-exponential discounting, we cannot compare
discounted utility at different times and hence the problem becomes time-inconsistent. In
order to handle that problem in a time-consisting way, we must introduce another concept
of solutions instead of an optimal control.
In the literatures of time-inconsistent control problems, several concepts of time-consistent
solutions have been introduced and investigated. The main approaches to handle time-
inconsistent control problems are to seek for, instead of optimal controls, time-consistent
equilibrium controls, which are within a game theoretic framework. Bjo¨rk, Khapko and
Murgoci [4] introduced a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy in a Markovian setting
and derived an extended HJB equation. Yong [17] considered a closed-loop equilibrium strat-
egy in a multi-players differential game framework with a hierarchical structure and derived
the so-called equilibrium HJB equation. These two methods to treat time-inconsistent con-
trol problems are extensions of the classical dynamic programming approaches. In contrast,
Hu, Jin and Zhou [12, 13] defined an open-loop equilibrium control for a time-inconsistent
linear-quadratic stochastic control problem and investigated a dynamic mean-variance con-
trol problem. They used a duality method in the spirit of the classical maximum principle
and characterized an open-loop equilibrium control by a “flow” of forward-backward stochas-
tic differential equations (FBSDEs for short), which is a coupled system consisting of a single
stochastic differential equation (SDE) and a continuum of backward SDEs (BSDEs) defined
on different time intervals. The solvability of a flow of FBSDEs remains a challenging open
problem except for some special cases; see Hamaguchi [9] for small-time solvability of a
flow of FBSDEs with Lipschitz continuous coefficients. In order to handle time-inconsistent
consumption-investment problems in a continuous-time model, Ekeland and Pirvu [6] were
the first to provide a precise definition of the equilibrium concept within a class of closed-
loop strategies in a Markovian model. They characterized the equilibrium policy through the
solution of a flow of BSDEs, and they showed, with a special form of the discount function,
this flow of BSDEs has a solution. Zhao, Shen and Wei [19] studied a time-inconsistent
consumption-investment problem in a non-Markovian model with the logarithmic utility
function and a general (Lipschitz continuous) discount function. They adopted the multi-
players differential game approach introduced by [17] and obtained a time-consistent strategy.
Zhao, Wang and Wei [20] also adopted the multi-players differential game approach to investi-
gate a time-inconsistent consumption-investment-reinsurance problem for an insurer with the
exponential utility function and a general discount function (with some structural assump-
tions). Their model is non-Markov, while the interest rate is assumed to be deterministic.
In contrast, within the class of open-loop controls, Alia et al. [3] studied a time-inconsistent
consumption-investment problem under a general utility function (but with some very strong
assumptions) and a general (Lipschitz continuous) discount function. They derived, by using
the same duality method as [12, 13], a flow of FBSDEs which characterizes the open-loop
equilibrium consumption-investment pair. They assumed that the market is complete and
the interest rate is deterministic. Note that their assumptions imposed on the utility function
is too strong to apply to the exponential utility case; see Remark 2.3 for some comments
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on their results. In fact, most literatures assume that the interest rate is deterministic, or
that the utility function has a specific form or satisfies some strong assumptions. It is also
worth mentioning that, compared to existence of an equilibrium control, there are only a few
results about uniqueness of the equilibrium control. For more details about time-inconsistent
stochastic control problems, see Yan and Yong [16] and its references.
The aim of this paper is to investigate an open-loop equilibrium strategy pair of a time-
inconsistent consumption-investment problem under general utility functions and general
discount functions. The novelties of this paper are as follows:
(i) The market is possibly incomplete and the interest rate is allowed to be a stochastic
process. Moreover, the investor is assumed to be endowed with a random income and
a random terminal lump-sum payment.
(ii) We provide a necessary condition (Theorem 3.1) and a verification theorem (Theo-
rem 4.1) for an open-loop equilibrium pair. Their conditions are related to the solv-
ability of the corresponding fully coupled FBSDE, which is more tractable than a flow
of FBSDEs appearing in [6, 3].
(iii) By using the above results, we prove that finding an open-loop equilibrium pair of the
time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem is equivalent to finding an optimal
pair of a time-consistent one (Theorem 5.3).
(iv) As a consequence, we get uniqueness of an open-loop equilibrium pair satisfying suitable
integrability conditions.
Let us remark on the result (iii). Recently, Alia [2] studied a time-inconsistent control problem
for a jump diffusion model under a general discount function and constructed an equivalent
time-consistent control problem. He firstly proved the equivalence of two problems and then
characterized an open-loop equilibrium control of the original time-inconsistent problem by
solving the associated time-consistent one. However, in his model all the coefficients are
assumed to be deterministic and some strong conditions are imposed. Since our model spec-
ified below does not satisfy these conditions, we cannot use his result directly. In contrast to
the above mentioned paper, we firstly characterize an open-loop equilibrium pair and then,
as a consequence, we get the associated time-consistent problem. Our method to prove the
main theorems (Theorems 3.1, 4.1) are inspired by Horst et al. [10]. They studied a time-
consistent utility maximization problem for the terminal wealth (without consumption) in an
incomplete market with a general utility function and characterized an optimal control by a
fully coupled FBSDE, which is different from that appearing in the classical duality method.
The key observation of their method is to derive the dynamics of the density process of an
equivalent martingale measure under which the optimal wealth process becomes a true mar-
tingale. This observation is called the martingale optimality principle, which goes back to Hu,
Imkeller and Mu¨ller [11] who treated some particular utility functions, that is, exponential,
logarithmic and power utility functions. See also Cheridito and Hu [5] for the martingale op-
timality principle for (time-consistent) consumption-investment problems under non-convex
constraints, where the above three types of utility functions and the exponential discount
function were treated. In this paper, we consider general utility functions defined on the
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whole real line and general discount functions. Unfortunately, due to the time-inconsistency,
the martingale optimality principle does not make sense in our problem. Our idea to treat a
time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem is, loosely speaking, to combine the tech-
nique of [10] and the duality method for time-inconsistent control problems. In such a way
we obtain a characterization of an open-loop equilibrium pair by an FBSDE, which has more
information about the structure of an open-loop equilibrium pair than the characterization
by the duality method; see Remark 3.7.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce our financial
market model. In Section 3 we provide a necessary condition for an open-loop equilibrium
pair in terms of an FBSDE. As a converse result, in Section 4 we derive a verification theorem,
that is, we show that a solution of the FBSDE appearing in the necessary condition allows to
construct an open-loop equilibrium pair. By using these results, in Section 5, we relate our
time-inconsistent problem to a time-consistent one, and show the uniqueness of an open-loop
equilibrium pair of the original time-inconsistent problem.
2 The model
Let T > 0 be a finite time horizon and W = (Wt)t∈[0,T ] be a d-dimensional Brownian
motion on a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P). F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] denotes the P-augmentation
of the filtration generated by W . Denote by Et[·] the conditional expectation given Ft for
each t ∈ [0, T ). 1lA denotes the indicator function for a set A, and Leb denotes the Lebesgue
measure on R. For t ∈ [0, T ], p, q ≥ 1 and H = R,Rd, define
L∞Ft(Ω;H) := {X : Ω→ H | X is an H-valued bounded Ft-measurable random variable} ,
L
p
F
(Ω;Lq(t, T ;H)) :=

X : Ω× [t, T ]→ H
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
X is an H-valued predictable process
such that E
[(∫ T
t
|Xs|
q ds
)p/q]
<∞

 ,
L
p
F
(t, T ;H) := Lp
F
(Ω;Lp(t, T ;H)),
and
L
p
F
(Ω;C([t, T ];H)) :=

X : Ω× [t, T ]→ H
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
X is an H-valued adapted continuous
process such that E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Xs|
p
]
<∞

 .
We consider a financial market consisting of a riskless asset S0 and d risky assets S˜i, i =
1, . . . , d. The prices of these assets follow the dynamics{
dS0t = rtS
0
t dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
S00 = 1,
and {
dS˜it = S˜
i
t(dW
i
t + b
i
t dt), t ∈ [0, T ],
S˜i0 = s˜
i
0 > 0,
i = 1, . . . , d,
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where r and bi, i = 1, . . . , d, are R-valued predictable processes. We assume that the in-
terest rate process r and the excess rate of return vector process θ := (b1 − r, . . . , bd − r)⊤
are bounded. It is well-known that in this market model arbitrage opportunities are ex-
cluded; see the textbook [14]. Consider a small investor receiving an income at a pre-
dictable rate e and an FT -measurable lump-sum payment E at time T who can consume
at intermediate times and invest in the financial market. Let d1 ∈ {1, . . . , d} and assume
that the investor can invest in the riskless asset S0 and the risky assets S˜1, . . . , S˜d1, while
the assets S˜d1+1, . . . , S˜d cannot be invested into. Note that if d1 < d (resp. d1 = d) then
the market is incomplete (resp. complete). Define WH := (W 1, . . . ,W d1 , 0, . . . , 0)⊤, WO :=
(0, . . . , 0,W d1+1, . . . ,W d)⊤, θH := (θ1, . . . , θd1 , 0, . . . , 0)⊤, and SH :=
∫ ·
0
(dWHs +θ
H
s ds). Here,
the notation H refers to “hedgeable” and O to “orthogonal”. (We borrowed these notations
from [10].) Hereafter, for each x = (x1, . . . , xd)⊤ ∈ Rd, we use the notations
xH = (x1, . . . , xd1 , 0, . . . , 0)⊤ and xO = (0, . . . , 0, xd1+1, . . . , xd)⊤.
If the investor whose initial wealth at time t ∈ [0, T ) is xt ∈ R consumes at a predictable rate c
and invests according to an Rd-valued predictable trading strategy π = (π1, . . . , πd1 , 0, . . . , 0)⊤,
where πis is the amount of money invested in stock i at time s, then his/her wealth X
(c,π) =
X(c,π,t,xt) evolves as
X(c,π)s = xt +
∫ s
t
ruX
(c,π)
u du+
∫ s
t
πu · dS
H
u +
∫ s
t
(eu − cu) du, s ∈ [t, T ]. (2.1)
Note that if
∫ T
t
(|es| + |cs| + |πs|
2) ds < ∞ a.s., then SDE (2.1) has a unique continuous
solution X(c,π). Suppose that the investor seeks for a pair (c, π) that maximizes the reward
functional
R(c, π; t, xt) := Et
[∫ T
t
λ1(t, s)U1(cs) ds+ λ2(t)U2(X
(c,π)
T + E)
]
(2.2)
over all admissible strategy pairs, where U1, U2 are utility functions for instantaneous con-
sumptions and the terminal wealth respectively, and λ1, λ2 are discount functions which
represent time-preferences of the investor. The standing assumptions are summarized as
follows.
Assumption. (i) r is an R-valued bounded predictable process and θ is an Rd-valued
bounded predictable process.
(ii) e is an R-valued predictable process such that
∫ T
0
|es| ds <∞ a.s., and E is an R-valued
FT -measurable random variable.
(iii) U1, U2 : R → R are three times differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and
satisfy the Inada condition; For i = 1, 2,
lim
x→∞
U ′i(x) = 0, lim
x→−∞
U ′i(x) =∞. (2.3)
(iv) λ1 : ∆[0, T ]→ R+ is continuous and strictly positive, where ∆[0, T ] := {(t, s) | 0 ≤ t ≤
s ≤ T}. Moreover, λ1(t, t) = 1 for any t ∈ [0, T ].
5
(v) λ2 : [0, T ]→ R+ is continuous and strictly positive.
In this paper we consider general utility functions (defined on the whole real line) and gen-
eral discount functions satisfying the above standing assumptions. Some possible examples
of discount functions are as follows:
• Exponential discounting:
λ1(t, s) = e
−δ(s−t), λ2(t) = e
−δ(T−t)
with some constant δ ≥ 0;
• Heterogeneous discounting:
λ1(t, s) = e
−δ1(s−t), λ2(t) = e
−δ2(T−t)
with some constants δ1, δ2 ≥ 0 such that δ1 6= δ2;
• Convex combination of two exponential discounting:
λ1(t, s) = αe
−δ1(s−t) + (1− α)e−δ2(s−t), λ2(t) = αe
−δ1(T−t) + (1− α)e−δ2(T−t)
with some constants α ∈ (0, 1) and δ1, δ2 > 0 such that δ1 6= δ2;
• Quasi-exponential discounting:
λ1(t, s) = (1 + α(s− t))e
−δ(s−t), λ2(t) = (1 + α(T − t))e
−δ(T−t)
with some constants α, δ > 0;
• Hyperbolic discounting:
λ1(t, s) =
1
1 + δ1(s− t)
, λ2(t) =
1
1 + δ2(T − t)
with some (possibly different) constants δ1, δ2 > 0.
In the above examples λ1 and λ2 can be seen as functions of s − t and T − t respectively.
More generally, we may consider the following type of discount functions:
• Exponential discounting with reference-time-dependent discount rates:
λ1(t, s) = e
−δ1(t)(s−t), λ2(t) = e
−δ2(t)(T−t)
with some nonnegative continuous functions δ1, δ2 : [0, T ]→ R+.
Note that the discount functions of the form as in the last example cannot be written as
functions of s−t or T−t, therefore they are beyond the class of discount functions considered
in the literatures [6, 19, 20, 3].
It is well-known that if λ1, λ2 are exponential discount functions, then the maximization
problem for reward functional (2.2) is time-consistent. However, if we assume that λ1, λ2 are
non-exponential discount functions, it is time-inconsistent in general; see Yong [17]. Instead
of finding a global optimal pair (which does not exist), we seek for an open-loop equilibrium
pair (c∗, π∗). To define an open-loop equilibrium pair, we impose the following condition on
a consumption-investment pair (c, π). Let x ∈ R be a given initial wealth.
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(H0)x c is an R-valued predictable process, π is an R
d-valued predictable process such that
π = (π1, . . . , πd1, 0, . . . , 0)⊤, and it holds that∫ T
0
(|cs|+ |πs|
2) ds <∞ a.s. and E
[∫ T
0
|U1(cs)| ds+ |U2(X
(c,π)
T + E)|
]
<∞,
where X(c,π) := X(c,π,0,x).
Denote by Πx0 the set of pairs (c, π) satisfying (H0)x. Moreover, we introduce the set of
perturbations; For each t ∈ [0, T ), define
χt := {(κ, η) | κ ∈ L
∞
Ft(Ω;R), η = (η
1, . . . , ηd1, 0, . . . , 0)⊤ ∈ L∞Ft(Ω;R
d)}.
Definition 2.1. For a given initial wealth x ∈ R, we call (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx0 an open-loop equilib-
rium pair if for any t ∈ [0, T ) and (κ, η) ∈ χt, it holds that
lim sup
ǫ↓0
R(ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ; t, X∗t )− R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t )
ǫ
≤ 0 a.s.,
where X∗ = X(c
∗,π∗,0,x), and the pair (ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ) = (ct,ǫ,κ, πt,ǫ,η) is defined by{
ct,ǫs := c
∗
s + κ1l[t,t+ǫ)(s),
πt,ǫs := π
∗
s + η1l[t,t+ǫ)(s),
for s ∈ [t, T ].
Remark 2.2. The above definition of an ope-loop equilibrium pair is inspired by [12, 13]. An
open-loop equilibrium pair is a time-consistent consumption-investment strategy pair satis-
fying a kind of local optimality condition. Note that we consider only bounded perturbations
(κ, η) ∈ χt of a pair (c
∗, π∗) ∈ Πx0 .
Remark 2.3. If the interest rate process r is deterministic, d1 = d (i.e. the market is com-
plete), (e, E) = (0, 0) (i.e. without endowments), U
(3)
1 , U
(3)
2 are bounded, and λ1, λ2 are of
the forms λ1(t, s) = λ(s − t) and λ2(t) = λ(T − t) for some Lipschitz continuous function
λ, then our model becomes (essentially) the same one as in Alia et al. [3]. They suggested
that in this setting an open-loop equilibrium control is characterized by a flow of FBSDEs.
However, their arguments are incomplete because of the following reasons:
(i) Integrability conditions on (c∗, π∗) are not discussed sufficiently. They assumed admis-
sible consumption processes are bounded but the resulting equilibrium consumption
process is not bounded.
(ii) The well-definedness of the term “limǫ↓0
1
ǫ
Et[
∫ t+ǫ
t
A(s; t) ds]” in their notation is not
clear and it should be checked carefully.
(iii) The assumption that U
(3)
1 , U
(3)
2 are bounded is too strong to apply to some important
problems in mathematical finance. For example, the exponential utility function does
not satisfy this assumption. Hence their application to such a special utility function
is questionable.
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The aim of this paper is to characterize an open-loop equilibrium pair by an FBSDE.
We must treat the integrability conditions and the limit operations carefully to overcome
the technical difficulties mentioned above. To do so, let us introduce further conditions of
consumption-investment pairs. Let x ∈ R and p > 1.
(H1)x,p (c, π) satisfies (H0)x and
E
[∫ T
0
U ′1(cs)
p ds+ U ′2(X
(c,π)
T + E)
p
]
<∞.
(H2)x,p (c, π) satisfies (H1)x,p. Moreover, there exists a constant q > 1 such that:
(i) E
[∫ T
0
M1(cs; δ)
q ds
]
<∞ for any δ ≥ 0;
(ii) For any t ∈ [0, T ) and (κ, η) ∈ χt, the family of FT -measurable random variables
{M2(X
(c,π)
T + E; |ξ
t,ǫ
T |)
q}ǫ∈(0,T−t) is uniformly integrable.
Here we used the notations
Mi(x; δ) := max
y∈R, |y|≤δ
|U ′′i (x+ y)|, x ∈ R, δ ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, (2.4)
and, for each t ∈ [0, T ), (κ, η) ∈ χt and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t), ξ
t,ǫ = ξt,ǫ,κ,η is defined as the unique
solution of the SDE{
dξt,ǫs = rsξ
t,ǫ
s ds+ η1l[t,t+ǫ)(s) · dS
H
s − κ1l[t,t+ǫ)(s)ds, s ∈ [t, T ],
ξ
t,ǫ
t = 0.
(2.5)
For i = 1, 2, we denote by Πx,pi the set of (c, π) satisfying (Hi)x,p. Clearly, it holds that
Πx,p2 ⊂ Π
x,p
1 ⊂ Π
x
0
for x ∈ R and p > 1, and
Πx,pi ⊂ Π
x,q
i
for 1 < q < p, x ∈ R and i = 1, 2. (H2)x,p is a technical condition which will be used in
Lemma 3.5 below. Indeed, for a large class of utility functions, (H1)x,p and (H2)x,p become
equivalent.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose that Ui, i = 1, 2, satisfy the following conditions:
(i)
U ′′i
U ′i
is bounded;
(ii) There exists a constant K > 0 such that
U ′i(x)
U ′i(y)
≤ exp(K(y − x)) for any x, y ∈ R with
x ≤ y.
Then Πx,p1 = Π
x,p
2 for any x ∈ R and p > 1.
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Proof. Note that, for i = 1, 2, U ′i is positive and decreasing. Hence for any x ∈ R and δ ≥ 0,
it holds that
Mi(x; δ) := max
y∈R, |y|≤δ
|U ′′i (x+ y)| = max
y∈R, |y|≤δ
∣∣∣∣U ′′i (x+ y)U ′i(x+ y)U ′i(x+ y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∥∥∥∥U ′′iU ′i
∥∥∥∥
∞
U ′i(x− δ).
Moreover, The assumption (ii) of this lemma yields that U ′i(x − δ) ≤ exp(Kδ)U
′
i(x), and
hence we obtain Mi(x, δ) ≤ ‖
U ′′i
U ′i
‖∞ exp(Kδ)U
′
i(x). Let (c, π) ∈ Π
x,p
1 with x ∈ R and p > 1.
Then for any δ ≥ 0 we get
E
[∫ T
0
M1(cs; δ)
p ds
]
≤
∥∥∥∥U ′′1U ′1
∥∥∥∥
p
∞
exp(pKδ)E
[∫ T
0
U ′1(cs)
p ds
]
<∞.
Moreover, we can easily show that, for any t ∈ [0, T ) and (κ, η) ∈ χt, it holds that
supǫ∈(0,T−t) E[exp(c|ξ
t,ǫ
T |)] < ∞ for any c > 0. Therefore, Ho¨lder’s inequality yields that,
for any q ∈ (1, p),
sup
ǫ∈(0,T−t)
E[M2(X
(c,π
T + E; |ξ
t,ǫ
T |)
q]
≤
∥∥∥∥U ′′2U ′2
∥∥∥∥
q
∞
sup
ǫ∈(0,T−t)
E
[
exp(qK|ξt,ǫT |)U
′
2(X
(c,π)
T + E)
q
]
≤
∥∥∥∥U ′′2U ′2
∥∥∥∥
q
∞
sup
ǫ∈(0,T−t)
E
[
exp
(
pq
p− q
K|ξt,ǫT |
)](p−q)/p
E
[
U ′2(X
(c,π)
T + E)
p
]q/p
<∞,
implying that the family of random variables {M2(X
(c,π)
T + E; |ξ
t,ǫ
T |)
q}ǫ∈(0,T−t) is uniformly
integrable for any q ∈ (1, p). Hence (c, π) ∈ Πx,p2 and this completes the proof.
Remark 2.5. Clearly exponential utility functions of the form U(x) = − exp(−γx) with
some constant γ > 0 satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 2.4. More generally, the following
class of utility functions, which was introduced by Fromm and Imkeller [8], also satisfies the
assumptions of Lemma 2.4: Utility functions U : R→ R of the form
U(x) = −
∫ ∞
x
∫ ∞
y
exp(−κ(z)) dz dy
with some twice differentiable function κ : R→ R satisfying
0 < inf
x∈R
κ′(x) ≤ sup
x∈R
κ′(x) <∞ and 0 ≤ inf
x∈R
κ′′(x) ≤ sup
x∈R
κ′′(x) <∞.
Indeed, by Lemma 1.2 in [8], U
′′
U ′
is bounded. Moreover, for any x, y ∈ R with x ≤ y,
U ′(x) =
∫ ∞
x
exp(−κ(z)) dz =
∫ ∞
y
exp
(
−κ(z − (y − x))
)
dz
≤
∫ ∞
y
exp
(
−κ(z) + κ′(z)(y − x)
)
dz
≤
∫ ∞
y
exp(−κ(z)) dz exp
(
‖κ′‖∞(y − x)
)
= U ′(y) exp
(
‖κ′‖∞(y − x)
)
,
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where in the first inequality we used the convexity of κ. Therefore the second assumption of
Lemma 2.4 is also satisfied.
3 A necessary condition for an equilibrium pair
In this section, we provide a necessary condition for an open-loop equilibrium pair.
Theorem 3.1. Fix an initial wealth x ∈ R and let (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p2 for some p > 1. If (c
∗, π∗)
is an open-loop equilibrium pair, then there exists a pair (Y, Z) such that:
(i) Y is anR-valued continuous adapted process such that U ′2(X
∗+Y ) is in Lp
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R)),
and Z is an Rd-valued predictable process satisfying
∫ T
0
|Zs|
2 ds <∞ a.s.;
(ii) (Y, Z) satisfies the following BSDE:{
dYs = Zs · dWs + f
∗(s, Ys, Zs) ds, s ∈ [0, T ],
YT = E,
(3.1)
where the generator f ∗ : Ω× [0, T ]× R× Rd → R is defined by
f ∗(s, y, z) := −
1
2
U
(3)
2
U ′′2
(X∗s + y)|π
∗
s + z|
2 − rs
U ′2
U ′′2
(X∗s + y)− rsX
∗
s − π
∗
s · θ
H
s − es + c
∗
s
for s ∈ [0, T ] and (y, z) ∈ R× Rd (where we suppressed ω);
(iii) It holds that {
c∗s = (U
′
1)
−1(λ2(s)U
′
2(X
∗
s + Ys)),
π∗s = −
U ′2
U ′′2
(X∗s + Ys)θ
H
s − Z
H
s ,
a.s. for a.e. s ∈ [0, T ]. (3.2)
In particular, the triplet (X, Y, Z) := (X∗, Y, Z) satisfies the following coupled FBSDE:

Xt = x−
∫ t
0
( U ′2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys)θ
H
s + Z
H
s
)
· dWs
+
∫ t
0
(
rsXs − |θ
H
s |
2 U
′
2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys)− θ
H
s · Z
H
s + es − (U
′
1)
−1(λ2(s)U
′
2(Xs + Ys))
)
ds,
Yt = E −
∫ T
t
Zs · dWs
−
∫ T
t
(
−rsXs + |θ
H
s |
2 U
′
2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys) + θ
H
s · Z
H
s − es + (U
′
1)
−1(λ2(s)U
′
2(Xs + Ys))
−rs
U ′2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys)−
1
2
|θHs |
2U
(3)
2 (Xs+Ys)(U
′
2(Xs+Ys))
2
(U ′′2 (Xs+Ys))
3 −
1
2
U
(3)
2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys)|Z
O
s |
2
)
ds,
t ∈ [0, T ].
(3.3)
To prove Theorem 3.1, let us show several lemmas. We fix x ∈ R and p > 1.
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Lemma 3.2. For any (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p1 , there exists a pair (Y, Z) satisfying the conditions (i)
and (ii) in Theorem 3.1 such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ), (κ, η) ∈ χt and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t), it holds
that, a.s.,
R(ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ; t, X∗t )−R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t )
ǫ
=
(
1
ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
(
λ1(t, s)U
′
1(c
∗
s)− λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
s + Ys)
)
ds
])
κ
+
(
1
ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
(
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys)θ
H
s + U
′′
2 (X
∗
s + Ys)(π
∗
s + Z
H
s )
)
ds
])
· η
−
1
2ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
λ1(t, s)
∫ 1
0
∣∣U ′′1 (c∗s + µκ)∣∣ dµ ds |κ|2 + λ2(t)
∫ 1
0
∣∣U ′′2 (X∗T + E + µξt,ǫT )∣∣ dµ ∣∣ξt,ǫT ∣∣2
]
.
(3.4)
Proof. Let (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p1 and fix t ∈ [0, T ), (κ, η) ∈ χt and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t). Define X
t,ǫ :=
X(c
t,ǫ,πt,ǫ,t,X∗t ) and ξt,ǫ := X t,ǫ − X∗. Then ξt,ǫ is the solution of SDE (2.5). Noting that U ′′1
and U ′′2 are negative, we see that
R(ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ; t, X∗t )−R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t )
ǫ
=
1
ǫ
Et
[∫ T
t
λ1(t, s)
(
U1(c
t,ǫ
s )− U1(c
∗
s)
)
ds+ λ2(t)
(
U2(X
t,ǫ
T + E)− U2(X
∗
T + E)
)]
=
(
1
ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
λ1(t, s)U
′
1(c
∗
s) ds
])
κ+ λ2(t)
1
ǫ
Et
[
U ′2(X
∗
T + E)ξ
t,ǫ
T
]
−
1
2ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
λ1(t, s)
∫ 1
0
∣∣U ′′1 (c∗s + µκ)∣∣ dµ ds |κ|2 + λ2(t)
∫ 1
0
∣∣U ′′2 (X∗T + E + µξt,ǫT )∣∣ dµ ∣∣ξt,ǫT ∣∣2
]
.
(3.5)
Now we investigate the conditional expectation Et[U
′
2(X
∗
T +E)ξ
t,ǫ
T ]. Note that U
′
2(X
∗
T +E) ∈
L
p
FT
(Ω;R) since (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p1 . Let (α, β) ∈ L
p
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R))× Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;Rd)) be the
unique adapted solution of the BSDE{
dαs = −rsαs ds+ βs · dWs, s ∈ [0, T ],
αT = U
′
2(X
∗
T + E).
(3.6)
Then αt = Et
[
e−
∫ T
t rs dsU ′2(X
∗
T + E)
]
a.s. for any t ∈ [0, T ]; see El Karoui et al. [7]. In
particular, αt is positive and hence (U
′
2)
−1(αt) is well-defined for any t ∈ [0, T ] a.s. Define a
process Y by Y := (U ′2)
−1(α)−X∗. Then Y is an R-valued continuous adapted process such
that U ′2(X
∗ + Y ) = α ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R)) and YT = E. Itoˆ’s formula yields that
d(X∗s + Ys) = d(U
′
2)
−1(αs)
=
1
U ′′2 ((U
′
2)
−1(αs))
dαs −
1
2
U
(3)
2 ((U
′
2)
−1(αs))
(U ′′2 ((U
′
2)
−1(αs)))3
d〈α, α〉s
=
1
U ′′2 (X
∗
s + Ys)
βs · dWs +
(
−
1
2
U
(3)
2 (X
∗
s + Ys)
(U ′′2 (X
∗
s + Ys))
3
|βs|
2 − rs
U ′2
U ′′2
(X∗s + Ys)
)
ds,
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and hence
dYs =
(
1
U ′′2 (X
∗
s + Ys)
βs − π
∗
s
)
· dWs
+
(
−
1
2
U
(3)
2 (X
∗
s + Ys)
(U ′′2 (X
∗
s + Ys))
3
|βs|
2 − rs
U ′2
U ′′2
(X∗s + Ys)− rsX
∗
s − π
∗
s · θ
H
s − es + c
∗
s
)
ds.
Define Z := 1
U ′′2 (X
∗+Y )
β − π∗. Then clearly Z is an Rd-valued predictable process satisfy-
ing
∫ T
0
|Zs|
2 ds < ∞ a.s. Moreover, from the above equation, we see that (Y, Z) satisfies
BSDE (3.1). Hence, (Y, Z) satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.1. It remains to
prove that the equality (3.4) holds. By the definitions of α and Y , using Itoˆ’s formula for
the process (αsξ
t,ǫ
s )s∈[t+ǫ,T ], we see that
Et[U
′
2(X
∗
T + E)ξ
t,ǫ
T ] = Et[αT ξ
t,ǫ
T ] = Et
[
Et+ǫ[αT ξ
t,ǫ
T ]
]
= Et[αt+ǫξ
t,ǫ
t+ǫ] = Et[U
′
2(X
∗
t+ǫ + Yt+ǫ)ξ
t,ǫ
t+ǫ].
Again by Itoˆ’s formula,
U ′2(X
∗
t+ǫ + Yt+ǫ)ξ
t,ǫ
t+ǫ
= U ′2(X
∗
t + Yt)ξ
t,ǫ
t +
∫ t+ǫ
t
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys)
(
η · dWHs + (rsξ
t,ǫ
s + η · θ
H
s − κ) ds
)
+
∫ t+ǫ
t
ξt,ǫs U
′′
2 (X
∗
s + Ys)
(
(π∗s + Zs) · dWs + (rsX
∗
s + π
∗
s · θ
H
s + es − c
∗
s + f
∗(s, Ys, Zs)) ds
)
+
1
2
∫ t+ǫ
t
ξt,ǫs U
(3)
2 (X
∗
s + Ys)|π
∗
s + Zs|
2 ds+
∫ t+ǫ
t
U ′′2 (X
∗
s + Ys)(π
∗
s + Z
H
s ) · η ds
= −
(∫ t+ǫ
t
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys) ds
)
κ+
(∫ t+ǫ
t
(
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys)θ
H
s + U
′′
2 (X
∗
s + Ys)(π
∗
s + Z
H
s )
)
ds
)
· η
+
∫ t+ǫ
t
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys)η · dW
H
s +
∫ t+ǫ
t
ξt,ǫs U
′′
2 (X
∗
s + Ys)(π
∗
s + Zs) · dWs.
Noting that
U ′2(X
∗ + Y ) = α ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R)), U ′′2 (X
∗ + Y )(π∗ + Z) = β ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;Rd)),
η ∈ L∞Ft(Ω;R
d), ξt,ǫ ∈
⋂
γ>1
L
γ
F
(Ω;C([t, T ];R)),
we can easily show that
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys)η · dW
H
s +
∫ t+ǫ
t
ξt,ǫs U
′′
2 (X
∗
s + Ys)(π
∗
s + Zs) · dWs
]
= 0.
Consequently, we get
Et[U
′
2(X
∗
T + E)ξ
t,ǫ
T ] =− Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys) ds
]
κ
+ Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
(
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys)θ
H
s + U
′′
2 (X
∗
s + Ys)(π
∗
s + Z
H
s )
)
ds
]
· η. (3.7)
Therefore, by (3.5) and (3.7), we obtain the equality (3.4).
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We want to calculate the limit of the right hand side of (3.4) when ǫ tends to zero. To
do so, we use the following lemma which was proved by Wang [15].
Lemma 3.3. If P = (P 1, . . . , Pm)⊤ ∈ Lγ
F
(0, T ;Rm) with m ∈ N and γ > 1, then for a.e. t ∈
[0, T ), there exists a sequence {ǫtn}n∈N ⊂ (0, T − t) depending on t satisfying limn→∞ ǫ
t
n = 0
and
lim
n→∞
1
ǫtn
∫ t+ǫtn
t
Et
[
|P is − P
i
t |
]
ds = 0, i = 1, . . . , m, a.s.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 3.3 in [15].
Lemma 3.4. For any (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p1 , consider the pair (Y, Z) in Lemma 3.2. Then there
exists a measurable set E1 ⊂ [0, T ) with Leb([0, T ] \E1) = 0 such that, for any t ∈ E1, there
exists a sequence {ǫtn}n∈N ⊂ (0, T − t) satisfying limn→∞ ǫ
t
n = 0 and, a.s.,
lim
n→∞
1
ǫtn
Et
[∫ t+ǫtn
t
(
λ1(t, s)U
′
1(c
∗
s)− λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
s + Ys)
)
ds
]
= U ′1(c
∗
t )− λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
t + Yt)
and
lim
n→∞
1
ǫtn
Et
[∫ t+ǫtn
t
(
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys)θ
H
s + U
′′
2 (X
∗
s + Ys)(π
∗
s + Z
H
s )
)
ds
]
= U ′2(X
∗
t + Yt)θ
H
t + U
′′
2 (X
∗
t + Yt)(π
∗
t + Z
H
t ).
Proof. Note that, for any t ∈ [0, T ) and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t), it holds that
E
[∣∣∣∣1ǫEt
[∫ t+ǫ
t
λ1(t, s)U
′
1(c
∗
s) ds
]
−
1
ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
U ′1(c
∗
s) ds
]∣∣∣∣
]
≤ max
t≤s≤t+ǫ
|λ1(t, s)− 1|
1
ǫ
∫ t+ǫ
t
E[U ′1(c
∗
s)] ds.
Since λ1 is continuous and λ1(t, t) = 1, we see that limǫ↓0maxt≤s≤t+ǫ |λ1(t, s)−1| = 0 for any
t ∈ [0, T ). Moreover, since E[U ′1(c
∗)] ∈ Lp(0, T ;R), by the Lebesgue differentiation theorem,
there exists a measurable set E˜1 ⊂ [0, T ) with Leb([0, T ] \ E˜1) = 0 such that, for any t ∈ E˜1,
the term 1
ǫ
∫ t+ǫ
t
E[U ′1(c
∗
s)] ds converges to E[U
′
1(c
∗
t )] <∞ as ǫ ↓ 0. Therefore, for each t ∈ E˜1,
it holds that
lim
ǫ↓0
E
[∣∣∣∣1ǫEt
[∫ t+ǫ
t
λ1(t, s)U
′
1(c
∗
s) ds
]
−
1
ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
U ′1(c
∗
s) ds
]∣∣∣∣
]
= 0.
Hence, for such t, there exists a sequence {ǫtn}n∈N ⊂ (0, T − t) such that limn→∞ ǫ
t
n = 0 and
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ 1ǫtnEt
[∫ t+ǫtn
t
λ1(t, s)U
′
1(c
∗
s) ds
]
−
1
ǫtn
Et
[∫ t+ǫtn
t
U ′1(c
∗
s) ds
]∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 a.s.
Moreover, since U ′1(c
∗) ∈ Lp
F
(0, T ;R), U ′2(X
∗ + Y ) ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R)), θH is predictable
and bounded, and U ′′2 (X
∗+ Y )(π∗+ZH) ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;Rd)), Lemma 3.3 yields that there
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exists a measurable set E1 ⊂ E˜1 with Leb([0, T ] \ E1) = 0 such that, for any t ∈ E1, there
exists a subsequence of {ǫtn}n∈N which we also denote by {ǫ
t
n}n∈N such that, a.s.,
lim
n→∞
1
ǫtn
Et
[∫ t+ǫtn
t
U ′1(c
∗
s) ds
]
= U ′1(c
∗
t ),
lim
n→∞
1
ǫtn
Et
[∫ t+ǫtn
t
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys) ds
]
= U ′2(X
∗
t + Yt),
lim
n→∞
1
ǫtn
Et
[∫ t+ǫtn
t
U ′2(X
∗
s + Ys)θ
H
s ds
]
= U ′2(X
∗
t + Yt)θ
H
t ,
and
lim
n→∞
1
ǫtn
Et
[∫ t+ǫtn
t
U ′′2 (X
∗
s + Ys)(π
∗
s + Z
H
s ) ds
]
= U ′′2 (X
∗
t + Yt)(π
∗
t + Z
H
t ).
Hence the assertions of Lemma 3.4 follow.
Lemma 3.5. Let (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p1 , (Y, Z), E1 and {ǫ
t
n}n∈N, t ∈ E1, be the ones in Lemma 3.4.
Fix an arbitrary δ > 0. If moreover (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p2 , then there exists a measurable set
E2 ⊂ E1 with Leb([0, T ] \E2) = 0 such that, for any t ∈ E2 and any (κ, η) ∈ χt with |κ| ≤ δ,
there exists a subsequence of {ǫtn}n∈N which we also denote by {ǫ
t
n}n∈N satisfying, a.s.,
lim sup
n→∞
1
2ǫtn
Et
[∫ t+ǫtn
t
λ1(t, s)
∫ 1
0
∣∣U ′′1 (c∗s + µκ)∣∣ dµ ds |κ|2
+λ2(t)
∫ 1
0
∣∣U ′′2 (X∗T + E + µξt,ǫtnT )∣∣ dµ ∣∣ξt,ǫtnT ∣∣2
]
≤ C
(
M1(c
∗
t ; δ) + Et
[
|U ′′2 (X
∗
T + E)|
q
]1/q)
(|κ|2 + |η|2),
where C > 0 is a constant which depends only on q, T, ‖λ1‖∞, ‖λ2‖∞, ‖r‖∞ and ‖θ
H‖∞,
and q is a constant satisfying the assertions in (H2)x,p.
Proof. Assume that (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p2 and let q > 1 be a constant satisfying the assertions in
(H2)x,p. Fix an arbitrary δ > 0. Note that, for any t ∈ [0, T ), (κ, η) ∈ χt with |κ| ≤ δ and
ǫ ∈ (0, T − t), it holds that
1
2ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
λ1(t, s)
∫ 1
0
∣∣U ′′1 (c∗s + µκ)∣∣ dµ ds |κ|2 + λ2(t)
∫ 1
0
∣∣U ′′2 (X∗T + E + µξt,ǫT )∣∣ dµ ∣∣ξt,ǫT ∣∣2
]
≤
‖λ1‖∞
2
(
1
ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
M1(c
∗
s; δ) ds
])
|κ|2 +
‖λ2‖∞
2
1
ǫ
Et
[
M2
(
X∗T + E;
∣∣ξt,ǫT ∣∣) ∣∣ξt,ǫT ∣∣2] a.s.,
(3.8)
where Mi, i = 1, 2, are defined by (2.4). Since M1(c
∗; δ) ∈ Lq
F
(0, T ;R), by Lemma 3.3, there
exists a measurable subset E2 ⊂ E1 with Leb([0, T ] \E2) = 0 such that, for any t ∈ E2, there
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exists a subsequence of {ǫtn}n∈N which we also denote by {ǫ
t
n}n∈N such that
lim
n→∞
1
ǫtn
Et
[∫ t+ǫtn
t
M1(c
∗
s; δ) ds
]
=M1(c
∗
t ; δ) a.s. (3.9)
Fix t ∈ E2 and let (κ, η) ∈ χt with |κ| ≤ δ. Denote |ξ
t,ǫtn,κ,η| by ξn for each n ∈ N. Then it
can be easily shown that
Et
[
ξ2γn
]
≤
(
Cγǫ
t
n(|κ|
2 + |η|2)
)γ
a.s.
for any n ∈ N and any γ > 1, where Cγ > 0 is a constant which depends only on γ, T, ‖r‖∞
and ‖θH‖∞. Hence, by Ho¨lder’s inequality, we obtain
1
ǫtn
Et
[
M2
(
X∗T + E;
∣∣ξt,ǫtnT ∣∣) ∣∣ξt,ǫtnT ∣∣2] ≤ 1ǫtnEt
[
M2(X
∗
T + E; ξn)
q
]1/q
Et
[
ξ2q/(q−1)n
](q−1)/q
≤ Cq/(q−1)Et
[
M2(X
∗
T + E; ξn)
q
]1/q
(|κ|2 + |η|2). (3.10)
Note that by considering a subsequence of {ǫtn}n∈N (which may depend on (κ, η)) we can
assume without loss of generality that limn→∞ ξn = 0 a.s., and hence
lim
n→∞
M2(X
∗
T + E; ξn) =M2(X
∗
T + E; 0) = |U
′′
2 (X
∗
T + E)| a.s.
Since the sequence {M2(X
∗
T + E; ξn)
q}n∈N is uniformly integrable by the condition (ii) in
(H2)x,p, we obtain
lim
n→∞
Et
[
M2(X
∗
T + E; ξn)
q
]
= Et
[
|U ′′2 (X
∗
T + E)|
q
]
a.s. (3.11)
By (3.8), (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11), we obtain the assertion of Lemma 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Assume that (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p2 is an open-loop equilibrium pair and let
δ > 0 be fixed. Take an arbitrary t from the set E2 obtained in Lemma 3.5. Let {δm}m∈N
be a sequence such that 0 < δm ≤ δ, m ∈ N, and limm→∞ δm = 0. For each m ∈ N, define
(κm, ηm) ∈ χt by {
κm = δm1l{U ′1(c∗t )−λ2(t)U ′2(X∗t +Yt)>0},
ηm = 0.
Denote by {ǫtn,m}n∈N the sequence corresponding to t ∈ E2 and (κm, ηm) ∈ χt, and let
cn,m = ct,ǫ
t
n,m,κm, πn,m = πt,ǫ
t
n,m,ηm , for n, m ∈ N. Then by the definition of the open-loop
equilibrium pair and Lemmas 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, we obtain, for each m ∈ N,
0 ≥ lim sup
n→∞
R(cn,m, πn,m; t, X∗t )− R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t )
ǫtn,m
≥
(
U ′1(c
∗
t )− λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
t + Yt)
)
1l{U ′1(c∗t )−λ2(t)U ′2(X∗t +Yt)>0}δm
− C
(
M1(c
∗
t ; δ) + Et
[
|U ′′(X∗T + E)|
q
]1/q)
δ2m a.s.
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Dividing both sides of the above inequality by δm and then letting m→∞, we obtain(
U ′1(c
∗
t )− λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
t + Yt)
)
1l{U ′1(c∗t )−λ2(t)U ′2(X∗t +Yt)>0} ≤ 0 a.s.,
and hence
U ′1(c
∗
t )− λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
t + Yt) ≤ 0 a.s.
Next, define (κm, ηm) ∈ χt by{
κm = −δm1l{U ′1(c∗t )−λ2(t)U ′2(X∗t +Yt)<0},
ηm = 0,
for each m ∈ N. By the same arguments as above, we can show that
U ′1(c
∗
t )− λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
t + Yt) ≥ 0 a.s.
Consequently, we obtain
U ′1(c
∗
t )− λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
t + Yt) = 0 a.s.,
showing that c∗t = (U
′
1)
−1(λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
t + Yt)) a.s.
Similarly, by considering{
κm = 0,
ηm = δm1l{U ′2(X∗t +Yt)θit+U ′′2 (X∗t +Yt)(π
∗,i
t +Z
i
t)>0}
ei,
m ∈ N, i = 1, . . . , d1,
and {
κm = 0,
ηm = −δm1l{U ′2(X∗t +Yt)θit+U ′′2 (X∗t +Yt)(π
∗,i
t +Z
i
t)<0}
ei,
m ∈ N, i = 1, . . . , d1,
where ei denotes the i th standard basis of R
d for i = 1, . . . , d, we can show that
U ′2(X
∗
t + Yt)θ
i
t + U
′′
2 (X
∗
t + Yt)(π
∗,i
t + Z
i
t) = 0 a.s., i = 1, . . . , d1.
Hence we get π∗t = −
U ′2
U ′′2
(X∗t+Yt)θ
H
t −Z
H
t a.s. Since t ∈ E2 is arbitrary and Leb([0, T ]\E2) = 0,
the equalities in (3.2) hold.
Lastly, by inserting the representation (3.2) into SDE (2.1) and BSDE (3.1), we see
that the triplet (X, Y, Z) := (X∗, Y, Z) satisfies FBSDE (3.3). This completes the proof of
Theorem 3.1.
Remark 3.6. The resulting FBSDE (3.3) is of a closed form in the sense that the coef-
ficients of the equation are determined only by the model and independent of the choice
of (c∗, π∗). Note also that, if d1 < d, i.e., if the market is incomplete, then the gen-
erator of the backward equation in FBSDE (3.3) has a quadratic growth with respect to
ZO = (0, . . . , 0, Zd1+1, . . . , Zd)⊤. On the other hand, If d1 = d, i.e., if the market is complete,
then the term |ZOs |
2 vanishes and all the coefficients of FBSDE (3.3) become linear with
respect to Z.
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Remark 3.7. By the arguments in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we see that the pair of adapted
processes (Y, Z) corresponding to (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p1 satisfies Y = (U
′
2)
−1(α) − X∗ and Z =
1
U ′′2 (X
∗+Y )
β−π∗, where (α, β) ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R))×Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;Rd)) is the unique adapted
solution of BSDE (3.6). Therefore, if (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p2 is an open-loop equilibrium pair, then
by the condition (3.2) we obtain{
U ′1(c
∗
s)− λ2(s)αs = 0,
αsθ
H
s + β
H
s = 0,
a.s. for a.e. s ∈ [0, T ]. (3.12)
Moreover, if we define (p, q) : Ω × ∆[0, T ] → R × Rd by pts := λ2(t)αs and q
t
s := λ2(t)βs for
(t, s) ∈ ∆[0, T ], then, for each t ∈ [0, T ], (pt, qt) ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;C([t, T ];R)) × Lp
F
(Ω;L2(t, T ;Rd))
satisfies the BSDE {
dpts = −rsp
t
s ds+ q
t
s · dWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
ptT = λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
T + E),
(3.13)
and the condition (3.12) becomes{
U ′1(c
∗
s)− p
s
s = 0,
pssθ
H
s + (q
s
s)
H = 0,
a.s. for a.e. s ∈ [0, T ]. (3.14)
This consequence generalizes the result obtained by Alia et al. [3] to an incomplete market
setting. The random field (p, q) satisfies a “flow” of BSDEs (3.13) with the additional con-
dition (3.14) imposed on the diagonal terms (pss, q
s
s). Note that the flow of BSDEs (3.13) is
a system of adjoint equations parametrized by t ∈ [0, T ] in the spirit of the duality method
for time-inconsistent stochastic control problems; see [12, 13, 3, 18, 16]. However, unlike
FBSDE (3.3), we cannot obtain an equation of a closed form directly by the system consist-
ing of (2.1), (3.13) and (3.14), since the condition (3.14) does not give an expression for the
investment process π∗. Hence, in our problem, the necessary condition stated in Theorem 3.1
has more information for the structure of an open-loop equilibrium pair than the consequence
obtained by the duality method.
4 A verification theorem
In Section 3, we proved that if there exists an open-loop equilibrium pair in the set Πx,p2 ,
then FBSDE (3.3) has an adapted solution. In this section, we prove the inverse direction.
In other words, we provide a verification theorem for an open-loop equilibrium pair.
Theorem 4.1. Fix x ∈ R and p > 1. Suppose that there exists a triplet (X, Y, Z) such that:
(i) X and Y are R-valued continuous adapted processes, and Z is an Rd-valued predictable
process satisfying
∫ T
0
|Zs|
2 ds <∞ a.s.;
(ii) U ′2(X + Y ) ∈ L
p
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R)) and
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣U1((U ′1)−1(λ2(s)U ′2(Xs + Ys)))∣∣ ds+ |U2(XT + E)|
]
<∞;
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(iii) (X, Y, Z) satisfies FBSDE (3.3).
Define (c∗, π∗) by {
c∗s = (U
′
1)
−1(λ2(s)U
′
2(Xs + Ys)),
π∗s = −
U ′2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys)θ
H
s − Z
H
s ,
s ∈ [0, T ]. (4.1)
Then (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p1 and it is an open-loop equilibrium pair for the initial wealth x with the
corresponding wealth process X(c
∗,π∗,0,x) = X .
Proof. Clearly the pair of predictable processes (c∗, π∗) defined by (4.1) satisfies
∫ T
0
(|c∗s| +
|π∗s |
2) ds < ∞ a.s. and π∗ = (π∗,1, . . . , π∗,d1, 0, . . . , 0)⊤. The continuous process X satisfies
SDE (2.1) with the initial value x at time zero and (c, π) = (c∗, π∗). By the uniqueness of the
continuous solution of SDE (2.1), we get X∗ := X(c
∗,π∗,0,x) = X . Then by the assumption
(ii) of this theorem we see that (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx0 . Moreover, since
E
[∫ T
0
U ′1(c
∗
s)
p ds+ U ′2(X
∗
T + E)
p
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(
λ2(s)U
′
2(Xs + Ys)
)p
ds+ U ′2(XT + YT )
p
]
≤
(∫ T
0
λ2(s)
p ds+ 1
)
E
[
sup
0≤s≤T
U ′2(Xs + Ys)
p
]
<∞,
we see that (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p1 .
Now let us show that (c∗, π∗) is an open-loop equilibrium pair. Fix arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ),
(κ, η) ∈ χt and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t). Define X
t,ǫ := X(c
t,ǫ,πt,ǫ,t,X∗t ) and ξt,ǫ := X t,ǫ −X∗. Then ξt,ǫ is
the solution of SDE (2.5). Since U1 and U2 are concave, we have
R(ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ; t, X∗t )−R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t )
ǫ
≤
1
ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
λ1(t, s)U
′
1(c
∗
s) ds κ+ λ2(t)U
′
2(X
∗
T + E)(X
t,ǫ
T −X
∗
T )
]
=
1
ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
λ1(t, s)λ2(s)U
′
2(Xs + Ys) ds κ+ λ2(t)U
′
2(XT + YT )ξ
t,ǫ
T
]
. (4.2)
Define α := U ′2(X + Y ). By the assumption, α is in L
p
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R)). Moreover, by Itoˆ’s
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formula,
dαs = U
′′
2 (Xs + Ys)(dXs + dYs) +
1
2
U
(3)
2 (Xs + Ys) d〈X + Y,X + Y 〉s
= U ′′2 (Xs + Ys)
(
rsXs − |θ
H
s |
2 U
′
2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys)− θ
H
s · Z
H
s + es − (U
′
1)
−1(λ2(s)U
′
2(Xs + Ys))
− rsXs + |θ
H
s |
2 U
′
2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys) + θ
H
s · Z
H
s − es + (U
′
1)
−1(λ2(s)U
′
2(Xs + Ys))
− rs
U ′2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys)−
1
2
|θHs |
2U
(3)
2 (Xs + Ys)(U
′
2(Xs + Ys))
2
(U ′′2 (Xs + Ys))
3
−
1
2
U
(3)
2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys)|Z
O
s |
2
)
ds
+
1
2
U
(3)
2 (Xs + Ys)
∣∣∣∣−(U ′2U ′′2 (Xs + Ys)θHs + ZHs
)
+ Zs
∣∣∣∣
2
ds
+ U ′′2 (Xs + Ys)
(
−
(U ′2
U ′′2
(Xs + Ys)θ
H
s + Z
H
s
)
+ Zs
)
· dWs
= −rsU
′
2(Xs + Ys) ds− U
′
2(Xs + Ys)θ
H
s · dW
H
s + U
′′
2 (Xs + Ys)Z
O
s · dW
O
s .
Thus, by letting β := −U ′2(X + Y )θ
H + U ′′2 (X + Y )Z
O, we see that
∫ T
0
|βs|
2 ds <∞ a.s. and
(α, β) satisfies the BSDE{
dαs = −rsαs ds+ βs · dWs, s ∈ [0, T ],
αT = U
′
2(XT + YT ).
Since α ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R)) and r is bounded, by using the BDG inequality we can easily
show that β ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;Rd)). Moreover, again by Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
Et[U
′
2(XT + YT )ξ
t,ǫ
T ] = Et[αT ξ
t,ǫ
T ] = Et
[
Et+ǫ[αT ξ
t,ǫ
T ]
]
= Et[αt+ǫξ
t,ǫ
t+ǫ]
and
αt+ǫξ
t,ǫ
t+ǫ
= αtξ
t,ǫ
t +
∫ t+ǫ
t
αs
(
(rsξ
t,ǫ
s + η · θ
H
s − κ) ds+ η · dW
H
s
)
+
∫ t+ǫ
t
ξt,ǫs (−rsαs ds+ βs · dWs) +
∫ t+ǫ
t
βs · η ds
=
(∫ t+ǫ
t
(αsθ
H
s + β
H
s ) ds
)
· η −
(∫ t+ǫ
t
αs ds
)
κ+
∫ t+ǫ
t
αsη · dW
H
s +
∫ t+ǫ
t
ξt,ǫs βs · dWs.
By the definition of (α, β), we see that αθH + βH = 0. Moreover, noting that
α ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R)), β ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;Rd)),
η ∈ L∞Ft(Ω;R
d), ξt,ǫ ∈
⋂
γ>1
L
γ
F
(Ω;C([t, T ];R)),
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we can show that
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
αsη · dW
H
s +
∫ t+ǫ
t
ξt,ǫs βs · dWs
]
= 0 a.s.
Consequently, we get
Et[U
′
2(XT + YT )ξ
t,ǫ
T ] = −Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
αs ds
]
κ.
From this equality and the estimate (4.2) we obtain
R(ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ; t, X∗t )− R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t )
ǫ
≤
1
ǫ
Et
[∫ t+ǫ
t
(
λ1(t, s)λ2(s)− λ2(t)
)
αs ds
]
κ
≤ max
t≤s≤t+ǫ
|λ1(t, s)λ2(s)− λ2(t)| Et
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|αs|
]
|κ| a.s.
Since λ1 and λ2 are continuous, noting that λ1(t, t) = 1, the second line of the above inequal-
ities tends to zero as ǫ ↓ 0. Consequently, we obtain
lim sup
ǫ↓0
R(ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ; t, X∗t )− R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t )
ǫ
≤ 0 a.s.,
and hence (c∗, π∗) is an open-loop equilibrium pair.
Remark 4.2. Note that FBSDE (3.3) does not depend on the discount function λ1 of the
utility of consumptions. Consequently, if the conditions in Theorem 4.1 are satisfied, then
the pair (c∗, π∗) defined by (4.1) is an open-loop equilibrium pair of the problem defined by
(λ1, λ2, U1, U2) for any λ1 satisfying the standing assumption.
Remark 4.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 the process U ′2(X + Y ) evolves as
U ′2(Xt + Yt) =U
′
2(x+ Y0)−
∫ t
0
rsU
′
2(Xs + Ys) ds
−
∫ t
0
U ′2(Xs + Ys)θ
H
s · dW
H
s +
∫ t
0
U ′′2 (Xs + Ys)Z
O
s · dW
O
s , t ∈ [0, T ].
Therefore, by letting ρ :=
U ′2(X+Y )
U ′2(x+Y0)
and νO :=
U ′′2
U ′2
(X + Y )ZO, we get
ρ = exp
(
−
∫ ·
0
rs ds
)
E
(
−
∫ ·
0
θHs · dW
H
s +
∫ ·
0
νOs · dW
O
s
)
,
where E(·) denotes the stochastic exponent. The positive continuous semimartingale ρ can
be seen as a pricing kernel or a state density price for the incomplete market consisting of
the riskless asset and the tradable risky assets 1, . . . , d1; see the textbook [14].
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5 An equivalent time-consistent problem
In this section, we investigate a relationship between an open-loop equilibrium pair of a
time-inconsistent control problem and an optimal pair of a time-consistent problem. Define
the sets of coefficients of the reward functional as follows:
Λ1 :=
{
λ1 : ∆[0, T ]→ R+
∣∣∣∣∣ λ1 is continuous, strictly positiveand satisfies λ1(t, t) = 1, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]
}
,
Λ2 := {λ2 : [0, T ]→ R+ | λ2 is continuous and strictly positive},
U :=
{
U : R→ R
∣∣∣∣∣ U is three times differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concaveand satisfies the Inada condition (2.3)
}
.
The reward functional R is determined by (λ1, λ2, U1, U2) ∈ Λ1 × Λ2 × U × U. We refer to
the time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem with coefficients (λ1, λ2, U1, U2) and
an initial wealth x ∈ R as Problem (I)xλ1,λ2,U1,U2.
By Theorems 3.1, 4.1 and Remark 4.2, we easily obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. Suppose that a triplet (λ2, U1, U2) ∈ Λ2 × U × U is given. Fix an initial
wealth x ∈ R and let (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p2 for some p > 1. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) For some λ1 ∈ Λ1, (c
∗, π∗) is an open-loop equilibrium pair for Problem (I)xλ1,λ2,U1,U2 ;
(ii) For any λ1 ∈ Λ1, (c
∗, π∗) is an open-loop equilibrium pair for Problem (I)xλ1,λ2,U1,U2.
Next, we introduce a time-consistent consumption-investment problem which turns out to
be equivalent to Problem (I)xλ1,λ2,U1,U2 in some sense. For each triplet (λ2, U1, U2) ∈ Λ2×U×U,
define
R(c, π; x) := E
[∫ T
0
1
λ2(s)
U1(cs) ds+ U2(X
(c,π,0,x)
T + E)
]
for x ∈ R and (c, π) ∈ Πx0 . Moreover, we consider the set
Πx,p3 := Π
x
0 ∩
(
L
p
F
(Ω;L1(0, T ;R))× Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;Rd))
)
for each x ∈ R and p > 1. A standard utility maximization problem for the reward functional
R (within the class of open-loop controls) is stated as follows: For each x ∈ R and p > 1,
find a pair (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p3 such that
R(c∗, π∗; x) = sup
(c,π)∈Πx,p3
R(c, π; x). (5.1)
We refer to the above maximization problem as Problem (C)x,pλ2,U1,U2. We call a pair (c
∗, π∗)
satisfying (5.1) an optimal pair. It is well known that Problem (C)x,pλ2,U1,U2 is time-consistent.
Indeed, the following lemma holds true.
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Lemma 5.2. Fix an initial wealth x ∈ R and let (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p3 for some p > 1. Denote the
corresponding wealth process by X∗. If (c∗, π∗) is an optimal pair for Problem (C)x,pλ2,U1,U2,
then for any t ∈ [0, T ) and (c, π) ∈ Πx,p3 satisfying (cs, πs) = (c
∗
s, π
∗
s) for s ∈ [0, t), it holds
that
R(c, π; t, X∗t ) ≤ R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t ) a.s.,
where
R(c, π; t, X∗t ) := Et
[∫ T
t
1
λ2(s)
U1(cs) ds+ U2(X
(c,π,t,X∗t )
T + E)
]
.
Proof. Fix arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ) and (c, π) ∈ Πx,p3 satisfying (cs, πs) = (c
∗
s, π
∗
s) for s ∈ [0, t).
Let A ∈ Ft be an arbitrary set and consider the pair (c
t,A, πt,A) ∈ Πx,p3 defined by
ct,As :=
{
c∗s for s ∈ [0, t),
1lAcs + 1lAcc
∗
s for s ∈ [t, T ],
πt,As :=
{
π∗s for s ∈ [0, t),
1lAπs + 1lAcπ
∗
s for s ∈ [t, T ].
Denote the corresponding wealth process X(c
t,A,πt,A,0,x) by X t,A. Then clearly
X t,As =
{
X∗s for s ∈ [0, t),
1lAX
(c,π,t,X∗t )
s + 1lAcX
∗
s for s ∈ [t, T ].
Since (c∗, π∗) is an optimal pair for Problem (C)x,pλ2,U1,U2 , we get
0 ≥ R(ct,A, πt,A; x)−R(c∗, π∗; x)
= E
[∫ T
0
1
λ2(s)
(
U1(c
t,A
s )− U1(c
∗
s)
)
ds+
(
U2(X
t,A
T + E)− U2(X
∗
T + E)
)]
= E
[(∫ T
t
1
λ2(s)
(
U1(cs)− U1(c
∗
s)
)
ds+
(
U2(X
(c,π,t,X∗t )
T + E)− U2(X
∗
T + E)
))
1lA
]
= E
[(
R(c, π; t, X∗t )−R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t )
)
1lA
]
.
Since A ∈ Ft is arbitrary, we obtain the result.
The next theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.3. Fix coefficients (λ1, λ2, U1, U2) ∈ Λ1×Λ2×U×U and an initial wealth x ∈ R.
Let (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p2 ∩Π
x,p/(p−1)
3 for some p > 1. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) (c∗, π∗) is an open-loop equilibrium pair for Problem (I)xλ1,λ2,U1,U2 ;
(ii) (c∗, π∗) is an optimal pair for Problem (C)
x,p/(p−1)
λ2,U1,U2
.
In particular, among all consumption-investment pairs in the set Πx,p2 ∩Π
x,p/(p−1)
3 , the open-
loop equilibrium pair for Problem (I)xλ1,λ2,U1,U2 is, if it exists, unique.
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Proof. Firstly, assume that (c∗, π∗) is an optimal pair for Problem (C)
x,p/(p−1)
λ2,U1,U2
. Fix arbitrary
t ∈ [0, T ), (κ, η) ∈ χt and ǫ ∈ (0, T − t). We extend the pair (c
t,ǫ, πt,ǫ) to [0, T ] by defining
(ct,ǫs , π
t,ǫ
s ) := (c
∗
s, π
∗
s) for s ∈ [0, t). Then X
t,ǫ := X(c
t,ǫ,πt,ǫ,t,X∗t ) is also extended as X t,ǫs = X
∗
s =
X
(ct,ǫ,πt,ǫ,0,x)
s for s ∈ [0, t). Note that
|U1(c
t,ǫ
s )| ≤ |U1(c
∗
s)|+ U
′
1(c
∗
s) |κ|1l[t,t+ǫ)(s) +
1
2
M1(c
∗
s; |κ|) |κ|
21l[t,t+ǫ)(s), s ∈ [0, T ],
and
|U2(X
t,ǫ
T + E)| ≤ |U2(X
∗
T + E)|+ U
′
2(X
∗
T + E) |ξ
t,ǫ
T |+
1
2
M2(X
∗
T + E; |ξ
t,ǫ
T |) |ξ
t,ǫ
T |
2,
where M1 and M2 are defined by (2.4) and ξ
t,ǫ := X t,ǫ − X∗ satisfies SDE (2.5). By these
inequalities and the assumption that (c∗, π∗) is in Πx,p2 with p > 1, we can show that
E
[∫ T
0
|U1(c
t,ǫ
s )| ds+ |U2(X
t,ǫ
T + E)|
]
<∞,
proving (ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ) ∈ Πx0 . Clearly (c
t,ǫ, πt,ǫ) ∈ L
p/(p−1)
F
(Ω;L1(0, T ;R))×L
p/(p−1)
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;Rd))
since (c∗, π∗) ∈ Π
x,p/(p−1)
3 . Hence, we have that (c
t,ǫ, πt,ǫ) ∈ Π
x,p/(p−1)
3 . Since (c
∗, π∗) is an
optimal pair for Problem (C)
x,p/(p−1)
λ2,U1,U2
, by Lemma 5.2, we obtain
0 ≥ R(ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ; t, X∗t )−R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t )
= Et
[∫ T
t
1
λ2(s)
(
U1(c
t,ǫ
s )− U1(c
∗
s)
)
ds+
(
U2(X
t,ǫ
T + E)− U2(X
∗
T + E)
)]
=
1
λ2(t)
Et
[∫ T
t
λ2(t)
λ2(s)
(
U1(c
t,ǫ
s )− U1(c
∗
s)
)
ds+ λ2(t)
(
U2(X
t,ǫ
T + E)− U2(X
∗
T + E)
)]
a.s.
Define a function λ˜1 : ∆[0, T ]→ R+ by
λ˜1(t, s) :=
λ2(t)
λ2(s)
, (t, s) ∈ ∆[0, T ].
Clearly λ˜1 is in Λ1. Denote by R˜ the reward functional corresponding to (λ˜1, λ2, U1, U2).
Then we get R˜(ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ; t, X∗t )− R˜(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t ) ≤ 0 a.s., in particular,
lim sup
ǫ↓0
R˜(ct,ǫ, πt,ǫ; t, X∗t )− R˜(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t )
ǫ
≤ 0 a.s.,
and hence (c∗, π∗) is an open-loop equilibrium pair for Problem (I)x
λ˜1,λ2,U1,U2
. By Corollary 5.1,
we see that (c∗, π∗) is an open-loop equilibrium pair for Problem (I)xλ1,λ2,U1,U2 too.
Conversely, assume that (c∗, π∗) is an open-loop equilibrium pair for Problem (I)xλ1,λ2,U1,U2.
By Theorem 3.1, there exists a pair (Y, Z) such that the assertions in that theorem hold true.
Define (α, β) by
α := U ′2(X
∗ + Y ) and β := −U ′2(X
∗ + Y )θH + U ′′2 (X
∗ + Y )ZO.
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Then by the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can show that (α, β) is
in Lp
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R))× Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;Rd)) and satisfies BSDE (3.6). Now take an arbitrary
(c, π) ∈ Π
x,p/(p−1)
3 . Define (cˆ, πˆ) := (c− c
∗, π − π∗) and ξˆ := X(c,π,0,x) −X∗. Then ξˆ satisfies
the SDE {
dξˆs = (rsξˆs + πˆs · θ
H
s − cˆs) ds+ πˆs · dW
H
s , s ∈ [0, T ],
ξˆ0 = 0.
Since r and θ are bounded and (cˆ, πˆ) ∈ L
p/(p−1)
F
(Ω;L1(0, T ;R))× L
p/(p−1)
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;Rd)), it
can be easily shown that ξˆ ∈ L
p/(p−1)
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R)). By the concavity of U1 and U2, we
have
R(c, π; x)−R(c∗, π∗; x) ≤ E
[∫ T
0
1
λ2(s)
U ′1(c
∗
s)cˆs ds+ U
′
2(X
∗
T + E)ξˆT
]
. (5.2)
Since c∗ has the representation in (3.2), we get
1
λ2(s)
U ′1(c
∗
s) = U
′
2(X
∗
s + Ys) = αs a.s. for a.e. s ∈ [0, T ]. (5.3)
Moreover, Itoˆ’s formula yields that
U ′2(X
∗
T + E)ξˆT = αT ξˆT
=
∫ T
0
αs
(
πˆs · dW
H
s + (rsξˆs + πˆs · θ
H
s − cˆs) ds
)
+
∫ T
0
ξˆs
(
βs · dWs − rsαs ds
)
+
∫ T
0
πˆs · βs ds
=
∫ T
0
(αsθ
H
s + β
H
s ) · πˆs ds−
∫ T
0
αscˆs ds+
∫ T
0
αsπˆs · dW
H
s +
∫ T
0
ξˆsβs · dWs
= −
∫ T
0
αscˆs ds+
∫ T
0
αsπˆs · dW
H
s +
∫ T
0
ξˆsβs · dWs,
where in the last equality we used the relation αθH + βH = 0. Note that, by Ho¨lder’s
inequality,
E
[(∫ T
0
|αsπˆs|
2 ds
)1/2]
≤ E
[
sup
0≤s≤T
|αs|
(∫ T
0
|πˆs|
2 ds
)1/2]
≤ E
[
sup
0≤s≤T
|αs|
p
]1/p
E
[(∫ T
0
|πˆs|
2 ds
)p/(2(p−1))](p−1)/p
<∞.
Similarly we get E[(
∫ T
0
|ξˆsβs|
2 ds)1/2] <∞. Therefore, we see that
E
[∫ T
0
αsπˆs · dW
H
s +
∫ T
0
ξˆsβs · dWs
]
= 0,
and hence
E
[
U ′2(X
∗
T + E)ξˆT
]
= −E
[∫ T
0
αscˆs ds
]
. (5.4)
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By (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4), we obtain R(c, π; x) ≤ R(c∗, π∗; x). Hence, (c∗, π∗) is an optimal
pair for Problem (C)
x,p/(p−1)
λ2,U1,U2
.
Lastly, since U1 and U2 are strictly concave, we see that the optimal pair for Prob-
lem (C)
x,p/(p−1)
λ2,U1,U2
is, if it exists, unique. Therefore, the last assertion of the theorem holds true.
This completes the proof.
Note that if λ1 and λ2 are exponential discount functions, i.e., λ1(t, s) = e
−δ(s−t), λ2(t) =
e−δ(T−t), (t, s) ∈ ∆[0, T ], with a constant δ ≥ 0, then for any (c, π) ∈ Πx0 it holds that
R(c, π; x) = E
[∫ T
0
1
e−δ(T−s)
U1(cs) ds+ U2(X
(c,π)
T + E)
]
= eδTE
[∫ T
0
e−δsU1(cs) ds+ e
−δTU2(X
(c,π)
T + E)
]
= eδTE
[∫ T
0
λ1(0, s)U1(cs) ds+ λ2(0)U2(X
(c,π)
T + E)
]
= eδTR(c, π; 0, x).
Similarly, for any t ∈ [0, T ) and any (c, π) ∈ Πx0 satisfying (cs, πs) = (c
∗
s, π
∗
s), s ∈ [0, t), for a
fixed (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx0 , it holds that
R(c, π; t, X∗t ) = e
δ(T−t)R(c, π; t, X∗t ) a.s.
Therefore, we obtain the following corollary, which would be expected (but not trivial from
the definition).
Corollary 5.4. Let (U1, U2) ∈ U×U and λ1(t, s) = e
−δ(s−t), λ2(t) = e
−δ(T−t), (t, s) ∈ ∆[0, T ],
for a constant δ ≥ 0. Fix an initial wealth x ∈ R and let (c∗, π∗) ∈ Πx,p2 ∩Π
x,p/(p−1)
3 for some
p > 1. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) (c∗, π∗) is an open-loop equilibrium pair;
(ii) (c∗, π∗) is optimal in Π
x,p/(p−1)
3 when viewed at the initial time, i.e., the following holds:
R(c∗, π∗; 0, x) = sup
(c,π)∈Π
x,p/(p−1)
3
R(c, π; 0, x).
Moreover, if the above conditions hold, then for any t ∈ [0, T ) and any (c, π) ∈ Πx,p3 with
(cs, πs) = (c
∗
s, π
∗
s), s ∈ [0, t), it holds that
R(c, π; t, X∗t ) ≤ R(c
∗, π∗; t, X∗t ) a.s.
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